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Abstract
The use of clinical laboratory tests has more than doubled during the past decade. Some observers of the
health system feel that this growth is excessive and is a result of current payment systems. This article
examines the effects of current reimbursement policies with regard to the use of laboratory tests and prices
charged for tests. The results suggest the following:
• The method of financing medical care, including cost sharing and prepaid group practice arrangements,
affects the volume of laboratory testing through the number of patient contacts with the medical care
system rather than through the number of tests used per patient contact.
• Fee ceilings on physician time appear to be partially offset by higher test prices.
• Cost-based reimbursement for hospital services is associated with higher charges in hospital
laboratories.
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Factors affecting laboratory test 
use and prices by Patricia Munch Danzon, Willard G. Manning Jr., and M. Susan Marquis · 
The use of clinical laboratory tests has more than 
doubled during the past decade. Some observers of 
the health system feel that this growth is excessive and 
is a result of current payment systems. This article 
examines the effects of current reimbursement policies 
with regard to the use of laboratory tests and prices 
charged for tests. The results suggest the following: 
• 	 The method offinancing medical care, including 
cost sharing and prepaid group practice arrange-
ments, affects the volume of laboratory testing 
through the number of patient contacts with the 
medical care system rather than through the num­
ber of tests used per patient contact. 
• 	 Fee ceilings on physician time appear to be partial· 
ly offset by higher test prices. 
• 	 Cost-based reimbursement for hospital services 
is associated with higher charges in hospital 
laboratories. 
Introduction 
Spiraling costs of health care have been a major 
concern for more than a decade. Recogr17ing the rela­
tionship between increased medical spending and the 
adoption and use of new medical technologies, many 
now question whether technological innovations have 
yielded benefits commensurate with their costs. Highly 
visible and high cost technologies, such as organ 
transplants and the computed tomography scanner, 
have come under particular scrutiny. However, 
expenditures for the less costly, less glamorous tech· 
nologies that are readily available to physicians, 
account for a large share of the growth in health 
expenses (Moloney and Rogers, ; ')79). 
Clinical laboratory testing is an example of a rela­
tively inexpensive procedure with high total costs. The 
number of laboratory tests performed grew 10 percent 
to 15 percent a year from 1950 to 1975; laboratory 
testing now accounts for $11 billion in annual medical 
care costs (Boisen, 1982). The number of ancillary ser­
vices, such as laborat.-.ry tests and X-rays per episode 
of illness, has increased steadily both in and out of 
the hospital (Sc:tovsky, 1979). Inpatient laboratory 
testing and radiologic services account for up to 25 
percent of hospital charges (Myers and Schroeder, 
1981). Expenditures for outpatient testing compose in 
excess of 25 percent of charges for outpatient physi· 
dan and ancillary services (Scitovsky, 1979). Although 
the growth in testing is due to several factors, many 
believe that current payment systems offer providers 
strong financial incentives to perform laboratory tests. 
Some argue that profit potential encourages physi­
cians to substitute the use of the laboratory for the 
use of their own time. Hospitals are reimbursed, in 
large part, on a cost-reimbursement basis that offers 
them little incentive to hold down costs (e.g., by per-
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forming fewer tests and other procedures). In addi­
tion, the patient has little economic reason to dis­
courage the physician from ordering tests because a 
large fraction of the patient's bill is paid by third 
parties. 
The conclusion that many draw from these argu­
ments is that payment systems need to be modified to 
encourage cost containment and discourage excessive 
laboratory testing. In one effort to alter incentives, 
Medicare and Medicaid revised regulations in 1981, 
limiting reimbursement for laboratory tests to the 
lesser of the laboratory's actual charge to the physi­
cian or the laboratory's reasonable charge for the 
tests. More recently, new legislation established a 
prospective per case hospital payment system for 
Medicare that is expected to restore physicians' incen­
tives to consider cost in ordering ancillary procedures, 
such as laboratory tests, for inpatients (U.S. Con­
gress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1983). 
Another solution offered iS to encourage cost con­
sciousness on the part of the consumer by making the 
patient responsible for a larger share of costs. Yet 
another solution, is to restructure the delivery system 
by encouraging the growth of health maintenance 
organizations (HMO's) and other alternatives to the 
current fee-for-service system with third-party 
reimbursement. 
The present research addressed the effect of current 
payment systems on the use of and charges for 
laboratory tests and the extent to which some of the 
proposed solutions might affect the use of laboratory 
tests. The question studied was: Do current payment 
systems encourage physicians to substitute the use of 
laboratory tests for other inputs, or does the growth 
in testing merely parallels the general growth in medi­
cal care utilization? ln particular, does the use of 
laboratory tests vary: 
• 	 With the level of the patient's insurance coverage? 
• 	 Between a health maintenance organization (HMO) 
and the fee·for-service system? 
• 	 With the physician-laboratory billing arrange­
ments? 
• 	 With regulation of the laboratory industry? 
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Also investigated were the effects of Medicare's previ­
ous cost-based reimbursement policy on laboratory 
test costs and charges,. and the effects of Medicare 
ceilings for office visit fees and room and board 
charges on laborawry test charges. 
The research was both theoretical and empirical. 
For the empirical analysis, a number of extant data 
sources were used, including surveys conducted for 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 
1975 and 1976 on physician practice costs and 
incomes (PPCI), data collected by Laboratory Man­
agement, and Medicare cost data. Data collected as 
part of the Rand health insurance experiment (HIE) 
have also been used. The experiment is a randomized 
trial in health care financing (Newhouse, 1974; New­
house, et al., 1981). Families in six sites were enrolled 
in one of a number of experimental insurance plans 
that varied in the share of the bill that the family had 
to pay for medical expenditures. In one site-Seattle, 
Washington-some of the experimental participants 
were enrolled in an existing HMO, Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound. 
The main theoretical and empirical findings are 
divided into sections concerning: the use of labora­
tory tests by fee-for-service office-based physicians; 
the use of laboratory tests in a health maintenance 
organization; and cost-based reimbursement and 
hospital laboratory prices. Throughout, results are 
highlighted with only brief discussions of the methods 
used. Details of the theoretical developments, the 
methodologies, and the empirical analyses can be 
found in four technical reports prepared as part of the 
research (Danzon, 1980 and 1982; Marquis, 1982; and 
Manning, 1983). 
Use of laboratory tests by office-based 
physicians 
Issues 
Out-of-hospital laboratory tests increased almost 70 
percent between 1972 and 1977 (Gibson, 1979). Some 
believe this growth is due to the financial incentives 
inherent in test ordering. Bailey (1979) argues that the 
profit potential in laboratory testing for physicians 
who perform tests in-house (i.e., in their own offices) 
and for those who purchase tests from laboratories 
and then bill their patients for the tests, encourages 
them to overuse tests. Bailey concludes that "moving 
the physician out of the financial transaction in test­
ing-via direct billing laws-is the only workable 
means of discouraging testing based on economic in­
centives" (Bailey, 1979). 
The growth of insurance coverage is also cited as 
a factor in the growth of laboratory tests. Neither 
patients nor physicians, acting on behalf of their 
patients, have an economic incentive to hold down the 
number of tests ordered because a large share of the 
bill is paid 'by insurance. Although generous insurance 
is widely believed to contribute to increased labora­
tory testing, previous empirical work has not investi­
gated the effects of the level of the patient's insurance 
coverage on the physician's decision about the number 
of tests to order for a patient visit. 
Another concern is that charges for tests by physi­
cians are excessive relati~e to their production cost. In 
particular, are cost savings, brought about by automa­
tion of many routine tests, captured by physicians 
rather than passed on to consumers? 
Theoretical findings 
The economic model used in this article assumes 
that physicians face a demand for visits that depends 
on the price consumers pay for a visit and the quality 
(level of care), per visit (Danzon, 1982; Marquis, 
1982). Physicians are assumed to produce quality by 
combining their own time and laboratory tests. They 
are also assumed to choose these quantities (and hence 
the quality level) and to set prices for their time and 
for tests so as to maximize profits. Insurers, however, 
may place limits on the charges they allow for time 
and tests. Fee schedules limit charges in some 
insurance plans; other plans have fee screens based on 
the usual, customary, and reasonable charge for the 
service. 
The model predicts that a physician will substitute 
laboratory tests for time to produce a unit of quality 
if the cost of tests decreases or if third-party allowable 
charges are reduced. However, changes in these fac· 
tors may also affect the level of quality produced, and 
the direction of this change is theoretically uncertain. 
Thus, the theory does not predict how a decrease in 
the cost of tests or in third-party allowable charges 
will affect the absolute number of tests per visit or the 
length of the visit, although the ratio of tests to time 
will increase. 
For similar reasons, the effect of an increase in the 
level of insurance coverage on the number of tests 
ordered per visit is uncertain. An increase in insurance 
coverage reduces the price that consumers pay for 
health care. Total health care consumed is expected to 
increase in response to this price decrease, but the 
direction of change in quality per visit is ambiguous. 
When a product has both a quality and quantity 
dimension, theory•does not predict whether the 
increase in total consumption of the product will be 
due to an increase in quantity, an increase in quality, 
or both (Willis, 1973). Although total health care con­
sumed and the total volume of laboratory tests are 
expected to increase if insurance coverage increases, 
the number of tests per visit may rise, fall, or remain 
unchanged. 
As noted earlier, there is an increase in the ratio of 
tests to time resulting from reductions in third-party 
allowable charges. However, this prediction holds 
only if there are binding controls on charges for both 
tests and time. Third-party payers are believed to be 
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more lenient in their review of charges for laboratory 
tests than for other services because laboratory 
charges on any one claim are typically small (Bailey, 
1979). If reimbursement for tests is not constrained, 
but there are limits on charges for physician time, the 
physician will vary test prices to achieve the optimum 
total price for the visit. (The physician will be able to 
do so if patients care only about the total charge for a 
visit and not how charges are divided between ser­
vices.) That is, a decrease in the allowable charge for 
physician time will lead to an offsetting increase in the 
charge for tests. The use of tests per visit and visit 
length, however, will not be affected. -similarly, a 
constraint on fees for tests alone will not affect the 
number of tests or time per visit, but there will be an 
offsetting increase in fees for time. 
Some have suggested that physicians who bill 
patients directly for tests have an incentive to order 
more tests than physicians who do not bill directly. As 
stated earlier, a reduction in the cost of tests leads 
physicians to substitute tests for time to produce each 
quality level. Therefore, if laboratories charge higher 
prices to patients than to physicians, one would expect 
physicians who control test. billing to use more tests 
per visit for a quality level than physicians who do 
not. If the market is competitive, test use would not 
be expected to differ between physicians who control 
test billing and those who do not, absent differences 
in laboratory price schedules. Bailey (1979) aigues 
that laboratories do use different price schedules for 
physicians and patients, and that this results in greater 
use of tests by physicians who control test billing. 
Different price lists do not necessarily mean that lab­
oratories practice price discrimination, however. Lab­
oratories argue that the price differences are due to 
cost differences; significant cost savings may be real­
ized by billing a doctor for patients treated instead of 
billing each patient for each test. 
Empirical findings 
Effects of patient's insurance coveraae 
The evidence suggests that the patient's insurance 
coverage is not an important factor in the number of 
laboratory tests ordered during a visit. A summary of 
findings analyzing data from the I 976 PPCI is given 
in Table 1. The numbers in the table are based on a 
logit regression explaining test frequency; they show 
how the probability that the physician orders a test 
during an outpatient visit changes if the patient has 
insurance that differs from Blue Shield coverage 
(Danzon, 1982).1 The change in probability given a 
change in insurance varies as the values of the other 
explanatory variables vary. The results in the table 
evaluate th.e probability change at one point in the 
distribution, namely at the mean values for the other 
explanatory characteristics. The change in probability 
for a physician with mean characteristics is not the 
1In addition 10 the insurance coverage indicator variables, other 
explanatory variables include the physician's spedalty, and charac· 
teristics of the physician's practice and the local lab-oratory indus­
try. 
same as the mean change over all physicians. The 
results suggest that if the patient is uninsured, the 
probability that the physician performs any laboratory 
tests is 8.7 percentage points lower than if the patient 
has Blue Shield coverage. Although this difference is 
not statistically significam, it might suggest that physi­
cians are more likely to order tests as the insurance 
coverage of the patient increases. However, the signs 
and rankings of the results for the other insurance 
plans are not consistent with this hypothesis. Medi­
care, supplemented by private insurance, and Medi­
caid are the plans in which out-of-pocket costs to the 
patient are likely to be lowest. If more generous insur­
ance induced an increase in tests per visit, physicians 
would order more tests fOr patients with Medicaid or 
supplemented Medicare than for patients on any other 
plan. However, the results show that the probability 
of ordering a test is lower for patients with Medicaid 
or supplemented Medicare; only for Medicaid patients 
is test ordering significantly lower. 
Tabla 1 
Effects of patient's Insurance coverage on test 
frequency: Physician practice costs and 
Incomes data results 
Change in test frequency 







Supplemented Medicare -9.6 
Other insurance 0.8 
1Estlmated by fitting etoglt equation lor test trequency. The change 

estimate I& evaluated at mean of nonplan factors. 

2Signiflcantly different from zero. 

SOURCE: Danzon (1982), Table 3. 

In sum, the PPCI data do not show a consistent 
relationship between the patient's out-of-pocket cost 
and the probability that the physician performs a test 
during an office visit. In general, differences in test­
ordering frequency for patients with different levels 
of insuranCe coverage are not statistically significant. 
Because patients on the different insurance plans also 
differ in other characteristics, a true effect of the level 
of insurance coverage on the number of tests ordered 
per visit may be masked in the PPCI data. Medicaid 
patients include a large number of children; Medicare 
patients are elderly and disabled. Clinical factors asso­
ciated with the health problems and needs of these 
different groups may dominate any true effect of the 
level of insurance coverage on physician's test­
ordering behavior. Another factor in these data that 
might offset an effect of generous insurance benefits 
is differences in the cost for public and private 
copayors. 
The HIE data provide a better evaluation of the 
relationship between the patient's insurance and the 
number of tests ordered per visit. For the HIE study, 
families were randomly assigned to the experimental 
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insurance plans so that the health and sociodemo· 

graphic characteristics of families on one insurance 

plan were like those of families on any other plan. 

·Except for the level of insurance benefits, reimburse· 
ment factors did not differ across plans. The HIE 
data confirm the conclusion that insurance coverage is 
not a significant determinant of the number of tests 
ordered per visit. Estimates from the HIE show how 
the probability of a physician's ordering a test during 
an outpatient visit changes as the share of the bill the 
patient pays (cost sharing) rises from zero (see 
Table 2). The results shown in Table 2 are for all out­
patient visits; results for the probability of ordering 
a test during a routine examination are presented in 
Table 3. When specifically controlling for diagnosis, 
the results are similar to those for all visits; and the 
probability of ordering a test neither increases nor 
decreases consistently as the patient's cost sharing 
increases. Further, differences in the probability of 
ordering tests for patients with varying levels of cost 
sharing were not significant. 
Table 2 
Effects of pati8nt's insurance coverage on test 
frequency: Outpatient visits 




to no cost sharing (free care) 1 

Patient's cost sharing 2 Adult patient Child patient 
Coinsurance percent Percent change 
25 0.8 -2.5 
50 6.3 -6.0 

95 -0.4 2.0 

Outpatient services only 
95 5.7 0.0 
1Estimated by fitting a probil equation for test frequency. The 

change estimate is evaluated at the mean of nonplan factors In the 

regression including the physician's specialty, and other characteris· 

tics of the physician. 

2The coinsurance rate applies until the family's out-of-pocket ex· 

penditure reaches a specified amount that depends on the level of 

family Income. The maximum out-of-pocket expenditure faced by any 

family Is $1000. 

SOURCE: Marquis (1982), Tables 2 and 3. 

Table 3 
Effects of patient's insurance coverage on test 
frequency: Routine examination 




to no cost sharing (free care) 1 

Patient's cost sharing 2 Adult patient Child patient 
Coinsurance percent Percent change 
25 0.2 5.1 
50 -8.8 -5.6 
95 -0.3 -2.7 
Outpatient services only 
95 0.0 4.0 
1 Estimated by fitting a pro bit equation for test frequency. The 

change estimate Is evaluated at mean of nonplan factors In the re­

gression, including the physician's specialty, and other characteris· 

lies oltlle physician. 

2The coinsurance rate applies until the family's out-of-pocket ex· 

penditure reaches a specified amount that depends on the level of 

family income. Tile maximum out-of-pocket expenditure faced by any 

family Is $1000. 

SOURCE: Marquis (1982), Tables 2 and 3. 

However, one should not conclude from these 
results that physicians' decisions about ordering tests 
are insensitive to the level of their patients' cost 
sharing. Although the health characteristics of 
individuals assigned to any one plan are the same 
as characteristics of individuals on other plans, the 
health characteristics of patients actually seeking 
care may not be balanced across plans. Patients with 
generous insurance benefits are more likely to consult 
a physician (Newhouse eta!. 1981) and, therefore, 
may be, on average, less sick than patients on other 
plans who seek care. Physicians may tend to order 
more tests per visit for patients with generous cover­
age than for other patients who are equally sick; 
however, there is no observable effect of insurance 
on test ordering frequency because of the greater 
health needs of patients with less generous insurance. 
The results show that different influences on physi­
cians' test-ordering decisions roughly balance. Hence 
one would not expect to observe an increase in the 
number of tests ordered per visit in response to an 
increase in the share of outpatient care charges paid 
by third-parties. 
Both the PPCI and HIE data suggest that insurance 
coverage is not a significant determinant of the num­
ber of laboratory tests ordered during a visit; how­
ever, one can expect to find that changes in insurance 
coverage will substantially alter the total volume of 
laboratory tests. Data from the HIE have demon­
strated that the extent of insurance coverage does 
affect the number of physician visits (Newhouse et al. 
1981) and the number of episodes of illness treated 
(Keeler eta!. 1983). Individuals with full coverage for 
medical care have 46 percent more physician office 
visits than individuals who are responsible for 95 per­
cent of their medical expenditures·. Because tests per 
visit do not vary as insurance varies, annual test vol­
umes for outpatient care would be expected to vary 
across insurance plans about the same percentage as 
physician visit rates. 
Effects of third party ceilings on allowable costs 
Analysis of the 1975 PPCI data supports the 
hypothesis that controls on office visit fees are at least 
panially offset by higher fees for laboratory tests. A 
$1 decrease in the Medicare allowable charge for an 
office visit is predicted to increase the fee for a com­
plete blood count (CBC) by 5 percent (or about 50 
cents); a $1 decrease in the Medicaid allowable charge 
is predicted to lead to a 4 percent increase in the price 
of a CBC (Danzon, 1982). 
If physicians who are faced with constraints on 
office visit fees adjust test prices to achieve the 
optimum total price, greater variability between physi­
cians in prices charged for tests than in office visit 
fees can be expected. A comparison of the coefficients 
of variation for fees for a routine followup office visit 
with those for a CBC can be seen in Table 4. For 
each of the five physician specialties and for the 
group as a whole, the coefficient of variation is higher 
for the CBC fee than for the physician visit fee. 
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Table 4 
Variation In physician fees by specialty 
Coefficient of variation 1 
Complete blood 
Specialty Office visit fee count fee 
Total .37 .59 
General practice .22 .70 
General surgery .38 .65 
Pediatrics .31 34 
Obstetrics/gynecology .39 .49 
Internal medicine .30 .35 
1The coefficient of variation Is th-e standard deviation divided by the 
mean. Because It Is a relative measure, free of the units in which the 
variable Is measured, the coefficient of variation Is useful for compar· 
lng the spread of variables measured in dUierent units or with differ· 
ent mean. For the total semple. the mean office visit fee was 12.0 and 
the atandard deviation was 4.4; the mean lor the complete blood 
count f&e was 8.0 and Its standard deviation was 4.8. 
SOURCE: Danzon (1982), Table 8. 
Effects of test location and test-billing arrangements 
The PPCI data showed that the size of the physi­
cian's practice was positively correlated with the deci­
sion to perform tests in-house and the frequency of 
ordering tests. The two results imply a positive cor­
relation between the frequency of tests and doing tests 
in-house. The HIE data also showed a positive 
relationship between testing in-house and the rate of 
test ordering. 
Further, the HIE data weakly indicated that physi­
. dans who purchased tests and billed their patieOis 
performed more tests than physicians who referred 
patients to laboratories that directly bill the patient. 
The probability that the physician ordered a test 
during a visit by an adult was I 0 percentage points 
higher if the patient was tested in-house than if the 
patient was referred to a laboratory that billed 
directly; for visits by children, the difference was 12 
points. If the physician purchased tests and billed the 
patient, the probability of ordering tests for an adult 
was 6 percentage points higher than if the laboratory 
billed the patient; the difference in test frequency for 
children was 7 percentage points. Although the results 
evidenced consistently greater test frequency among 
physicians who control test billing than among those 
who do not, the estimates were imprecise and not 
statistically different from zero. 
Although the results suggest that the frequency of 
test ordering is higher if the physician performs tests 
in-house or otherwise controls test billing, the results 
"do not necessarily support Bailey's assertion that 
direct billing requirements would lower the rate of 
tests ordered. Because of scale economies for in-house 
testing, physicians who decide to test in-house are 
likely to be those who anticipate a high test volume. 
An expected high test volume may also provide an 
incentive to control the billing for purchased tests. 
That is, the causation may run from test volume to 
decisions about whether to produce tests or to obtain 
billing control rather than the reverse. With the avail­
able data, the causality cannot be disentangled. Thus, 
one cannot conclude that physicians who perform 
tests in-house or who control billing of tests are 
induced to order more tests than other physicians. 
Effects of cost of production 
Automation has dramatically reduced the cost of 
performing many tests. The concern that the cost sav­
ings have not been passed on to consumers but have 
been captured by physicians has been noted earlier. 
Although direct measures of the cost to physicians of 
purchasing tests were not available, characteristics of 
the local laboratory industry likely to be associated 
with costs wer.e included in the analysis of the PPCI 
data. 
Characteristics expected to be associated with a 
lower cost of purchased tests were significantly related 
to lower fees charged to patients for a CBC. This 
implies that, at least to some degree, cost savings are 
passed on to patients. Lower costs of purchased tests 
are also expected to result in a higher total test 
volume; however, the effect of lower costs on tests 
per visit cannot be predicted from theory and is an 
empirical question. The analysis showed that charac­
teristics associated with a lower cost of tests were also 
associated with an increase in tests per visit. 
Effects of regulation 
Some laboratory work is regulated. The basic reg­
ulations include personnel qualifications, quality con­
trol, and record keeping requirements. The Centers 
for Disease Control regulate independent laboratories 
operating in interstate commerce. In addition, any 
independent laboratory performing testsrfor Medicare 
patients is subject to regulation. Many States have 
also adopted some form of regulation of independent 
laboratories. In contrast, laboratories located in physi­
cians' offices are, in general, exempt from these reg­
ulations. 
The effect of regulation is generally to raise the cost 
of operation of independent laboratories; thus, regula­
tion would be expected to affect prices for tests and 
test frequency in the same way as any change in the 
cost of production. Regulations may have other con­
sequences as well. Those that raise operating costs of 
independent laboratories but exempt physician office 
laboratories may confer a cost advantage to in-house 
testing. Regulations, such as anti-rebate laws and 
truth-in-billing regulations, are aimed at reducing the 
profit potential of tests for physicians; these regula­
tions would also be expected to increase physicians' 
incentive to perform tests in-house in order to realize 
the profit potential in testing. 
After controlling for characteristics of the local lab­
oratory industry, there were no significant effects of 
regulation on test frequency or the decision to do tests 
in-house (Danzon, 1982). However, there is a correla­
tion between the structure of the industry and the 
degree of regulation of the industry, a.nd this coree­
hampers estimation of the net effects of each. Regula­
tion may well affect the characteristics of the indus­
try, the frequency of testing, and the propensity of 
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local physicians to test in-house, but it is itself prob­
ably also affected by these factors (Danzon, 1982). 
Some unresolved issues are the direction of causation 
among the structure of the laboratory industry, the 
prescribing practices of physicians, and the regulation 
of the laboratory industry. 
Use of laboratory tests in a health 
maintenance organization 
Issues 
A number of observers of the health care sector 
believe that a restructuring of the deliver.y system is 
necessary to alter the financial incentives that have 
resulted in rampant inflation in medical care 
(Enthoven and Noll, 1979). These observers argue that 
regulatory efforts at cost control have not been effec­
tive and that increased cost-sharing in the fee-for­
service medical system would place an undesirable 
amount of the burden of economizing on consumers. 
Proponents of this view feel that institutional arrange­
ments such as health maintenance organizations 
(HMO's) provide incentives to physicians to use 
resources efficiently. 
An HMO provides health services to its members 
for a fixed, periodic payment that is set in advance 
and is independent of the use of services. In this sys­
tem, physicians do not receive additional income when 
they provide a greater number of, or more expensive, 
services. Therefore, advocates believe that the pro­
vider will not overprescribe treatment because the 
HMO bears the full cost of additional care. In con­
trast, in the ft!-for-service system, physicians receive 
additional payment for additional service. HMO 
advocates suggest that payment-for-service, coupled 
with extensive insurance coverage, which shields the 
patient from the full cost of additional services, en­
courages providers to overprescribe treatments. 
Much of the empirical evidence that HMO's are 
more cost conscious than fee-for-service providers is 
weak because of two flaws in most available data 
(Luft, 1980). First, in many comparisons of fee-for­
service with HMO's, the amount of cost sharing 
required of patients differs between the alternative 
systems; that is, it is not clear whether cost-sharing 
differences or institutional structures drive the results. 
Second, the empirical evidence may be biased by self­
selection. HMO enrollees have voluntarily chosen the 
HMO over the fee-for-service system. If HMO's 
attract healthier or sicker people than the fee-for­
service system, then differences between the systems 
may reflect differences in the (usually unmeasured) 
health status of members instead of institutional 
differences. 
This research, using data from the HIE, investi­
gated differences in the use of laboratory services 
between the fee-for-service system and an HMO. 
Because the HIE,is a randomized, controlled trial, 
these data do not exhibit flaws inherent in previous 
studies. 
Empirical findings 
In the analysis, a comparison was made of tests 
used between three groups of participants in the HIE. 
One group is a random sample of the Seattle, Wash­
ington population enrolled by the HIE in a plan with 
no patient cost sharing; this is referred to as the "free 
fee-for-service" plan because patients face no out-of­
pocket charges for their medical care. The second is a 
similar group enrolled experimentally by the HIE in 
an HMO plan at Group Health Cooperative of Puget 
Sound (GHC); thes.e individuals were not charged for 
any services obtained from GHC. The third is a ran­
dom sample of individuals who had already belonged 
to GHC-a control group. GHC subscribers are not 
charged for services used other than prescriptions, 
supplies, and certain mental health procedures. 
The group assigned to the free fee-for-service plan 
and those assigned to GHC are random samples from 
the same population, and both have the same insur­
ance benefits. Therefore, any difference in the use of 
laboratory testing between the groups can be attri­
buted to different incentives inherent in the fee-for­
service system and HMO's. The comparison is not 
confounded by self-selection or differences in cost­
sharing requirements. A comparison of the GHC 
experimental group and the GHC control group meas­
ures any self-selection into the GHC: The two groups 
differred only in that one group had voluntarily 
chosen the GHC over fee-for-service. 
The empirical analysis of data from the first two 
years of the study revealed no significant differences 
in annual outpatient laboratory test use between these 
three groups, after controlling for health status and 
socioeconomic characteristics. However, inpatient test­
ing for those in the fee-for-service system was almost 
twice that for patients in either HMO group. These 
results accord with other findings in the literature, 
which show that differences in utilization between the 
fee-for-service system and HMO's are concentrated in 
inpatient rather than outpatient care. The results of 
previous empirical work, which has found a lower 
rate of hospital admissions in HMO's as compared 
with the fee-for-service system, suggests that part, if 
not all of the difference in the volume of inpatient 
laboratory use between the systems is due to differ­
ences in admission rates rather than testing per admis­
sion. This is similar to the finding about cost sharing; 
that is, cost sharing affects the volume of outpatient 
laboratory tests in the fee-for-service system through 
effects on the number of patient contacts rather than 
test use per contact. In subsequent research, the esti­
mate of the difference between the systems in 
inpatient laboratory test use will be disaggregated; this 
will show the effect due to differences in admissions 
and the effect due to differences in test use per 
admission. 
Health Care Financing Review/Summer 1984/vo~um.s, Number4 28 
Predicted annual laboratory use per person in each 
of the groups is shown in Table 5. To obtain the pre­
dictions, two behavioral equations were used to model 
annual outpatient laboratory testing and two behav­
ioral equations were used for inpatient testing (Man­
ning, 1983). Annual per person laboratory use is then 
predicted for each group, assuming that individuals in 
each group have the distribution of age, sex, health 
and family characteristics observed in the free and 
GHC experimental population. 
Controlling for socioeconomic and health character­
istics, predicted annual laboratory use by the GHC 
control group is the same as use by the GHC experi­
mental group (Table 5). However, one might expect 
differences in actual use between the GHC control 
group and experimental group (i.e., before adjusting 
the groups to a common set of characteristics) because 
the control group is a self-selected one. In actual prac­
tice, individuals are not randomly assigned to HMO's 
but choose between an HMO and a conventional 
insurance plan. The issue of self-selection is important 
in the debate over the financing of medical care ser­
vices because many feel that HMO's hold down costs 
by attracting low utilizers and screening out sickly 
patients. 
Table 5 
Predicted annual per person use of laboratory 
tests In fee-for-service and an HMO 1 
Group Outpatient use 2 Inpatient use 2 
Free fee-lor-service 31.8 (2.6) 12.3 (2.6) 
Group Health 
Cooperative 
experimental 34.0 (1.7) 3 6.9 (1.3) 
Group Health 
Cooperative controls 34.7 (2.5) 3 6.0 (1.3) 




2use Is measured in expenditure units which are obtained by multiply­

ing Califomia Relative Value Scale units by $.90 for 1976 services, $1.00 

for 1g77 services, and $1.10 for 1978 services. 

3significantly different from fee for service. 

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. 

SOURCE: Manning (1983), Table 4.2. 

The effect of self-selection is assessed by contrasting 
laboratory use by GHC controls under two assump­
tions: first, that the control group has the same distri­
bution of measured characteristics as the randomly 
selected experimental group; second, that the control 
group has the observed distribution of characteristics. 
The results, given in Table 6, show that the adjust­
ment for population characteristics does not alter pre­
dicted inpatient laboratory use, but it has a small 
effect on outpatient use. Predictions for outpatient 
laboratory services suggest that the GHC control 
group uses 7 percent more services than they would if 
they were a representative sample of the community. 
Thus, individuals who self-select into an HMO do not 
appear to be lower than average utilizers, at least in 
this example. However, these results are for one 
HMO in one site and may not generalize to other sites 
or to other prepaid group practices. 
Table& 
Predicted annual laboratory use by Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound 
Reference group Outpatient use 1 Inpatient use 1 
Experlmentals 34.7(2.5) 6.0 (1.3) 
Group Health 
Cooperative controls 37.3 (2.2) 6.1 (1.4) 
1Use measured in expenditure units, see footnote 2 in Table 5. 

NOTE: Standard errors are In parentheses. 

SOURCE: Manning (1983), Table 4.4. 

Cost-based reimbursement and hospital 
laboratory prices 
Issues 
Retroactive cost-based reimbursement is considered 
by many to be a principal cause of the rapid inflation 
in hospital costs. Some private insurance plans use 
cost-based reimbursement formulas; since the intro­
duction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966, this meth­
od of reimbursement has accounted for over half of 
hospital revenues. It is often argued that cost-based 
reimbursement offers little incentive for hospitals to 
be cost conscious in their delivery of services because 
additional costs generate additional revenues. Rising 
hospital costs have become a serious problem for the 
Medicare program and cost-based reimbursement is 
often cited as the cause. Recently, Congress legislated 
a prospective per-case payment system for the Medi­
care hospital insurance program, which is intended to 
restore the appropriate incentives absent under prior 
cost-based reimbursement policies. 
Cost based reimbursement is also criticized for its 
effects on the structure and level of charges to charge­
paying patients (Davis, 1973; Hellinger, 1975). Charge 
paying patients are those with no insurance and 
patients with insurance that reimburses on the basis of 
hospital prices rather than cost. In addition, recent 
attempts to control costs by Medicare, Medicaid, and 
State rate-setting commissions are said to have forced 
hospitals to increase their charges to charge-paying 
patients in order to cover their costs (Iglehart, 1979). 
Theoretical findings 
A theoretical model to analyze the effects of Medi­
care's reimbursement policies on charges and costs in 
hospital laboratories was presented in one of the series 
of reports for this study (Danzon, 1980). The basic 
Medicare formula is intended to pay for the share of 
hospital costs incurred on behalf of Medicare benefi­
ciaries. The thesis of the theoretical model is that 
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accounting costs reported for reimbursement purposes 
should not be interpreted as economic costs, but 
rather as prices to cost-paying patients. If the hospital 
serves both Medicare (or other cost-paying patients) 
and charge-paying patients, it can set two price sched­
ules. Charges are the prices to charge-paying patients; 
fully allocated costs are the prices to cost-paying 
patients. The hospital sets charges in each department 
and allocates overhead costs among departments to 
maximize revenue. 
The effect of cost-based reimbursement is to raise 
charges in all departments above the level that would 
be set by a profit maximizing monopolist in the 
absence of cost-paying patients. Both charges and 
costs in the hospital laboratory (or other department) 
are predicted to increase as the fraction of total 
laboratory (or other department) services provided to 
Medicare patients increase, and as allocated overhead 
cost increase. The optimum allocation of overhead 
requires that the Medicare share of services be the 
same in all departments; if the Medicare share is not 
uniform, revenue maximization requires allocating as 
much overhead as possible to the department used 
most intensively by Medicare patients. 
Medicare's reimbursement policies incorporate two 
constraints designed to control costs. First, Medicare 
imposes a ceiling on the per diem cost for daily ser­
vices (basic room and nursing services). Second, Medi­
care reimbursement is limited to the lesser of either 
costs or charges. 
It is predicted that a ceiling on allowable costs for 
daily services will increase the fraction of overhead 
allocated to the laboratory. This, in turn, implies 
some offsetting increase in both costs and charges in 
the laboratory. 
The constraint that Medicare reimbursement be the 
lesser of either costs or charges is also predicted to 
raise the level of laboratory costs and charges.1 The 
increase will be greater, the greater the laboratory's 
share of total Medicare charges across all 
departments. 
In sum, the theoretical analysis suggests that both 
costs and charges in the laboratory will be higher: 
• 	 The greater the fraction of laboratory services pro­
vided to Medicare patients. 
• 	 The greater the laboratory share of total hypotheti­
cal charges for Medicare patients. 
• 	 The lower the ceiling on per diem costs. 
Empirical findings 
The predictions of the theoretical model were tested 
with 1976 data on a sample of short-stay general hos­
pitals in California; the data are from Medicare cost 
reports and the California Health Facilities Commis­
sion. The California Medicaid program, Medi-Cal, 
uses a reimbursement formula similar to that of Medi­
care, so the theoretical predictions should apply to 
both programs. 
2This result may not hold if an increase In charges leads to a large 
reduction in the fraction of billed charges actually collected. 
The empirical analysis supports the theoretical pre­
diction that cost-based reimbursement results in higher 
laboratory costs and charges. Table 7 summarizes the 
effects of reimbursement variables on fully-allocated 
costs and charges. These results were obtained by 
regressing reimbursement variables and other explana­
tory variables on costs and charges (Danzon, 1980). 
Summary results from two regressions are reported 
for both costs and charges. The first includes only the 
Medicare and Medicaid share of laboratory services as 
reimbursement variables. These are the factors that 
reflect the effect of cost-based reimbursement in the 
absence of Medicare cost controls. The second set of 
results adds the fraction of the total Medicare charges 
incurred in the laboratory and the limit on daily ser­
vices costs. These additional reimbursement variables 
reflect the effect of the cost controls. 
Table7 
Effects of reimbursement factors on 
laboratory costs and charges 1 
Excluding cost Including cost 
control control 
measures measures 
Dependent variable Cost Charges Cost Charges 
lab services 
Medicare percent 28.2 2Q.3 24.0 22.3 
lab services 
Medicaid percent 8.6 211.7 27.2 29.0 
Lab share of 
Medicare percent 12.6 221.2 
Actuallper diem limit 1.4 0.5 




2Significantly different from zero. 

SOURCE: Oanzon (1980), Table 3. 

Using the Medicare and Medicaid shares 01 lavutd­
tory services as the only reimbursement variables, the 
results show that a 10 percent increase in the Medicaid 
share increases fully allocated laboratory cost by 8.2 
percent and laboratory charges by 9.3 percent; a 10 
percent increase in the Medicaid share results in an 
8.6 percent increase in fully allocated laboratory cost 
and an 11.7 percent increase in charges. Thus, as pre­
dicted by the theoretical model, an increase in the 
fraction of laboratory services provided to cost-paying 
patients increases both costs and charges. 
In the second set of results, additional reimburse­
ment variables that capture the effect of cost controls 
are added. The laboratory share of total Medicare 
charges has a positive effect on both costs and 
charges, as predicted if the lesser of costs and charges 
constraint is binding. The limit on per diem costs does 
not appear to affect either costs or charges. The per 
diem ceilings were not binding on most hospitals dur­
ing the year covered by the data, so the absence of a 
positive effect is not a valid test of the hypothesis that 
a ceiling on costs for daily services increases costs and 
charges in the laboratory. 
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The analysis of laboratory charges did suggest that 
cost control efforts by Medicare result in higher prices 
to charge-paying patients. As noted earlier, some have 
argued that cost control efforts have forced hospitals 
to shift nonreimbursed costs from their cost-paying 
patients onto their charge-paying patients; that is, 
charge-paying patients are subsidizing Medicare, Med­
icaid, and other cost-paying patients. This argument 
requires that charges exceed costs. Among the sample 
of California hospitals in 1976, laboratory charges did 
exceed laboratory costs, indicating a shifting from 
cost-paying to charge-paying patients. However, total 
operating costs exceeded total operating charges, 
though by only I or 2 percent. This evidence suggests 
that shifting from cost- to charge-paying patients in 
some departments is more than offset by a reverse 
shift in other departments. 
Summary of findings and conclusions 
In this research, the effects of reimbursement poli­
cies on the use of, and charges for laboratory tests 
were investigated. The principal findings are: 
• 	 The level of the patient's insurance coverage does 
not influence the number of tests ordered during 
an outpatient visit. Nonetheless, further increases 
in the share of ambulatory care expenditures paid 
for by third parties would result in higher total test 
volumes because physician visit rates are higher the 
more generous the insurance coverage. 
• 	 Laboratory use is lower in an HMO than in the 
fee-for-service system. The difference is concen­
trated in inpatient use of the laboratory; no differ­
ences were detected in ambulatory laboratory use 
between the two systems. 
• 	 Physicians who control test billing order more tests 
per visit than other physicians. It may be that 
physicians who expect to perform many tests have 
an incentive to do the tests in-house or to purchase 
tests and bill their patients, rather than to have the 
laboratory bill the patients directly. Hence, physi­
cian control of test billing may be the result of an 
anticipated high test volume rather than the cause 
of a higher test-ordering frequency. 
• 	 Fee ceilings on inputs other than laboratory tests, 
such as physician time, are partially offset by 
higher test prices. Medicare and Medicaid fee ceil­
ings on office visit fees were associated with higher 
fees for tests. Hospital laboratory charges were not 
affected by per diem ceilings on basic room and 
nursing services, but the ceilings were not binding 
on most hospitals. 
• 	 Cost-based reimbursement for hospital services 
appears to increase costs and charges in hospital 
laboratories; the larger the share of laboratory ser­
vices attributable to cost-paying patients, the 
higher are hospital laboratory costs and charges. 
Further, charges for laboratory service exceeded, 
on average, the costs of services, suggesting that 
charge-paying patients subsidize hospital laboratory 
use by Medicare and other cost-paying patients. 
For the hospital as a whole, however, there was no 
evidence of such a cross subsidy. 
This research has shown that the method of financ­
ing medical services, including cost sharing and 
prepaid group practice, can affect the volume of lab­
oratory tests. Some policy initiatives under considera­
tion may reduce the trend toward greater use of tests. 
Under present reimbursement policies, testing has 
increased to a point that some observers fear may be 
excessive. However, the theoretical results summarized 
in this article show that reimbursement policies wi!J 
not induce an excessive substitution of tests for other 
inputs unless there are constraining fee controls on all 
inputs. Our empirical work tended to support this 
theory. The empirical work suggests that much of the 
growth in laboratory testing reflects the impact of 
reimbursement policies on the number of patient con­
tacts with the medical care system, rather than an 
increased use of tests per contact. Addressing the con­
sequences for patient outcomes of the growth in test 
use was outside the scope of this study; other research 
must assess whether the additional laboratory tests 
have produced patient benefits that are commensurate 
with the additional costs. 
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